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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2330 
___________ 
 
DEREK A. CAPOZZI, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN USP - LEWISBURG 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 12-cv-00604) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 9, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 15, 2015 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Derek A. Capozzi appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, which denied his habeas petition.  We will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. 
 Capozzi is a federal inmate serving a sentence for firearms and extortion offenses.  
In 2010, he was housed at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.  In 
March of that year, he was released to the custody of the United States Marshals Service 
on a writ of habeas corpus ad testifcandum to testify at a trial in Kentucky.  The Marshals 
transferred Capozzi to the Grayson County Detention Center (“GCDC”) for his time in 
Kentucky.  When officials from GCDC were transporting Capozzi back to the airport to 
return to Lewisburg, Capozzi escaped and was later recaptured and eventually returned to 
USP-Lewisburg.  After his return, Capozzi was disciplined for the escape under the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) Inmate Discipline Program.1  Among other 
sanctions, the Prison disallowed 68 days of good conduct time. 
 Following unsuccessful administrative appeals, Capozzi filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus in the District Court arguing solely that the BOP lacked jurisdiction to 
discipline him for the escape because he was not in BOP custody at the time of the 
misconduct.  The District Court rejected Capozzi’s argument and he timely appealed. 
                                              
1 Capozzi was also criminally charged with and convicted of knowingly escaping from 
the GCDC officials, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a).  United States v. Capozzi, 747 F. 
Supp. 2d 846, 848 (E.D. Ky. 2010), aff’d, 723 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 654 (2013). 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  In a federal 
habeas proceeding, we exercise plenary review over a district court’s legal conclusions.  
Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013).  We may affirm a district court for 
any reason supported by the record.  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 Capozzi argues on appeal that the BOP did not have jurisdiction to discipline him. 
He argues that “custody” for purposes of the federal criminal code is not the same as 
custody for purposes of BOP disciplinary proceedings, and that the latter requires actual 
physical custody of the inmate.  He also argues that the Respondent’s filings in response 
to his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations, and in response 
to his motions to strike, should be stricken and the arguments therein should be deemed 
waived.  We need not reach his waiver argument, because we conclude that even without 
considering any of the arguments that Respondent raised in the filings to which Capozzi 
objects, Capozzi’s jurisdictional claim is wrong as a matter of law. 
 In examining whether the BOP has correctly construed the scope of its authority to 
discipline federal inmates, we first ask whether “Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.”  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842 (1984).  We have not discovered any statutory authority that states that 
only inmates in physical custody are subject to the BOP’s discipline.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4001(b)(2) (Attorney General may “classify the inmates[] and provide for their proper 
government, discipline, treatment, care, rehabilitation, and reformation”); 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 4042(a)(3) (“The [BOP], under the direction of the Attorney General, shall-- . . . (3) 
provide for the protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons charged with or 
convicted of offenses against the United States.”).2  Because the statute is silent, we turn 
to the regulations.  “When a statute expressly leaves a gap for an agency to fill with its 
rulemaking authority, the agency’s regulations must receive ‘controlling weight unless 
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”  Stiver v. Meko, 130 
F.3d 574, 577 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). 
 Capozzi urges us to consult 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.1 and 541.2.  He argues that the text 
of those regulations makes clear that the BOP’s disciplinary rules apply only to inmates 
in physical custody of the Bureau, either by being in a BOP facility, or by being 
designated to a facility with which the BOP has an agreement.3  He notes that at the time 
                                              
2 The pertinent portions of these statutes have not changed since the time of Capozzi’s 
escape. 
 
3 The regulations provide as follows: 
 
This subpart describes the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (Bureau) inmate discipline 
program.  This program helps ensure the safety, security, and orderly operation of 
correctional facilities, and the protection of the public, by allowing Bureau staff to 
impose sanctions on inmates who commit prohibited acts.  Sanctions will not be imposed 
in a capricious or retaliatory manner.  The Bureau's inmate discipline program is 
authorized by 18 U.S.C. 4042(a)(3). 
 
28 C.F.R. § 541.1 (eff. June 20, 2011). 
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of the misconduct, he was not in the physical custody of a BOP facility, nor had he been 
designated to serve his sentence in a facility with which the BOP has an agreement.  He 
also argues, by way of analogy, that federal inmates serving their sentences in non-
contract facilities (such as GCDC), are not subject to the BOP’s disciplinary rules.4 
 However, the regulation and Program Statement to which Capozzi refers were not 
promulgated until 2011.  At the time of Capozzi’s escape, the regulation read as follows: 
So that inmates may live in a safe and orderly environment, it is necessary 
for institution authorities to impose discipline on those inmates whose 
behavior is not in compliance with Bureau of Prisons rules. The provisions 
of this rule apply to all persons committed to the care, custody, and control 
(direct or constructive) of the Bureau of Prisons. 
 
28 C.F.R. § 541.10(a) (2010) (emphasis added).  While this is a very broad statement, we 
cannot say that it is an arbitrary interpretation of the statute or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.  We find that Capozzi was, at the very least, under the constructive control of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
This program applies to sentenced and unsentenced inmates in Bureau custody.  It also 
applies to sentenced and unsentenced inmates designated to any prison, institution, or 
facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of, or under an agreement with, 
the Bureau of Prisons. 
 
28 C.F.R. § 541.2 (eff. June 20, 2011). 
 
4 The BOP’s Program Statement with regard to § 541.2 states that the “policy applies to 
all persons in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons or Bureau contract facilities . . 
. [but does] not apply to Federal inmates designated to a non-Federal facility (e.g., 
inmates serving Federal sentences in state or county facilities).”  BOP Program Statement 
5270.09 (eff. Aug. 1, 2011). 
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BOP at the time of his escape.  Further, the corresponding Bureau of Prisons’ Program 
Statement in effect at the time is similarly broad: 
Examples of persons to whom this policy applies include, but are not 
limited to, an inmate who is on pretrial status, or on writ, or on escorted trip 
or furlough, or who is escorted by U.S. Marshals or other federal law 
enforcement officials, or who is in a camp, contract facility, (other than 
contract CCCs) or hospital, or who is returned to Bureau custody from a 
contract facility (includes contract CCCs). These provisions do not apply to 
a federal inmate designated to a non-federal facility (e.g., inmates serving 
Federal sentences in state facilities or contract CCCs). 
 
Program Statement 5270.08 (Dec. 4, 2009) (emphasis added).  While Program 
Statements are due less deference than a regulation, see Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 
159, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that Program Statements are due less deference 
because they are not promulgated under the Administrative Procedures Act and they can 
be changed at will by the BOP), we are willing to give this particular Program Statement 
some deference, as it does not explicitly conflict with the regulation or governing statute, 
cf. id. at 164 (rejecting Program Statement that is inconsistent with statute and 
regulation).  The statement clearly applies the provisions of the discipline program to 
someone in Capozzi’s situation—he was “on writ” at the time of his escape.   
 In sum, as Capozzi does not dispute the fact that he has been convicted of an 
offense against the United States, he is and was subject to the discipline of the Attorney 
General (and the Attorney General’s designee, the BOP) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4042(a)(3).  The regulation in effect at the time permissibly construed the statute to 
include discipline of inmates in the constructive control of the BOP, and the Program 
Statement made clear that misconduct while “on writ” would be covered.   
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 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District Court properly denied the 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and we will affirm the Court’s judgment. 
